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ABSTRACT 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was created in 
1975 with the ambition of economically integrating West African countries so that they 
can achieve harmonious development. Successive crises in the region, however, have led 
to the realization that the absence of peace destroys all development efforts intended by 
the economic integration initiative. In order to prevent the breach of peace and to 
participate in conflict management, ECOWAS adopted two protocols in 1978 and 1981, 
after which, in 1993, the organization revised its founding text to broaden its action scope 
to political and security issues. The Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), considered the armed wing of ECOWAS, was, at the 
beginning, an ad hoc force. However, it gained permanent status in 1999 with the 
adoption of the Protocol on Mechanism for Prevention, Conflict Resolution, 
Peacekeeping and Security. ECOMOG intervened in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and 
the Ivory Coast. From the outbreak of the crisis in northern Mali in January 2012 to the 
French intervention in January 2013, ECOWAS was not able to generate support for the 
troops of Mali to defend their national territory. Since it took French intervention for 
ECOWAS to act, this project addresses the question: Why did the regional organization 
fail to take the lead role and instead seemingly bandwagon with the French?
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3 
D. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: LACK OF TRUST AND 
INTERNAL INSTABILITY .....................................................................6 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................7 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE ...............8 
II. ECOWAS HISTORICAL OVERVIEW .............................................................9 
A. THE DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL CONSOLIDATION IN 
WEST AFRICA .........................................................................................9 
B. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS A 
PROGRESSIVE VECTOR FOR INTEGRATION .............................10 
C. THE BIRTH OF ECOWAS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF 
WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ...............................11 
D. THE MUTATION OF ECOWAS TO EMBRACE A 
SECURITY DIMENSION ......................................................................13 
III. THE MALIAN CRISIS .......................................................................................19 
A. LIBYA’S INFLUENCE ON MALI ........................................................20 
1. Libya’s Historical Influence on Mali..........................................21 
2. The Influence of Kaddafi’s Overthrow ......................................22 
B. THE INSURRECTIONAL LEAGUE DEFEATING MALIAN 
MILITARY ...............................................................................................23 
1. The Insurgency .............................................................................24 
2. The Consequences ........................................................................26 
C. THE COUP AND THE FALL OF THE NORTH ................................27 
1. Problems Emerged from the Coup .............................................28 
2. ECOWAS’s Responses ................................................................31 
IV. TESTING EXPLANATIONS FOR ECOWAS’S NON-
INTERVENTION IN THE MALIAN CRISIS .................................................37 
A. HYPOTHESIS 1: NATIONAL INTEREST .........................................38 
B. HYPOTHESIS 2: PERSONAL POLITICS ..........................................41 
C. HYPOTHESIS 3: ORGANIZATION RESOURCES ...........................44 
D. HYPOTHESIS 4: DOMESTIC INSECURITY IN MEMBER 
STATES ....................................................................................................46 
viii 
E. HYPOTHESIS 5: DISTRUST OF ECOWAS .......................................49 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................53 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................57 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAFC Allied Armed Forces of the Community 
AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali 
AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
AU  African Union 
ECOMOG  Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States 
ICG International Crisis Group 
MEND Movement of Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
MOJWA Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
NLMA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
NPFL  National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
UN  United Nations 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
 
x 




Firstly, I would like to give my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Emily 
Meierding, for her constant support, patience, and motivation in all the processes of my 
thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor. 
Besides my advisor, I would like to express my gratitude and affection to my family 
for supporting me spiritually in my schooling as well as my life in general. 
To my dear son, Hassane, Dad loves you… 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In January 2012, the worst crisis Mali had ever experienced started. The severity of 
the crisis is equaled by its complexity. At first, the conflict appeared as a consequence of 
the Libyan civil war. After the overthrow of Kaddafi’s regime, his Touareg mercenaries 
pillaged Libyan armaments and fled toward the Sahara Desert to join rebel movements in 
the north of Mali. Those armed groups allied with other terrorist organizations, such as Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West 
Africa (MOJWA), as well as other narco-trafficker armed groups, and took control over 
the Malian towns of Aguel’hoc, Ménaka, and Tessalit. The Malian military’s successive 
defeats in the north caused turmoil in the south, which finally resulted in the overthrow of 
the democratically elected government by a group of non-commissioned officers on March 
22, 2012. 
The coup, which disorganized the military and broke its chain of command, put 
Mali’s entire northern region in the hands of rebel jihadists, who later proclaimed an 
Islamic state, on May 27, 2012, with “sharia” as the ruling law. Ten months later, on 
January 10, 2013, jihadists undertook an offensive toward the capital city Bamako. They 
were finally stopped by a French intervention, on January 11, 2013, which had been 
requested by the interim president. This intervention triggered the deployment of the 
African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), which is a military mission 
driven by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It is worth noting 
that the United Nations (UN) Security Council had previously given this African-led 
mission a mandate to intervene, with Resolution 2085 of December 20, 2012. The 
Resolution meant that AFISMA helped Malian armed forces take control of the occupied 
territory and drive terrorists out of the area. 
ECOWAS was first established with the aim of economically integrating the 
countries of western Africa, but it enlarged its objective to the security dimension, conflict 
prevention, management, resolution, and peacekeeping. ECOWAS is now considered “the 
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most prominent sub-regional organization in conducting peacemaking and peacekeeping 
missions in Africa”1 and “Africa’s most advanced regional peace and security 
mechanism.”2 Yet, surprisingly, it took French intervention for ECOWAS to act in Mali. 
This sub-regional organization therefore yielded its leadership in the settlement of the 
Malian crisis. This thesis project intends to address the question of why ECOWAS did not 
take a lead role in addressing the Malian crisis. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The topic has real-world as well as scholarly significance. It offers real-world 
significance in making some diagnoses of ECOWAS as an organization and shedding light 
on factors that have prevented it from fulfilling its missions. If these factors are likely to 
more generally prevent any other sub-regional arrangements from acting on such matters. 
The Malian crisis, which is still ongoing, offers a concrete case for evaluating the 
organization. Heads of state and governments, as well as leaders of institutions, can seize 
the opportunity to better understand ECOWAS’s potential to serve as a stabilizing force 
for regional security. Second, this study integrates an academic significance by adding to 
the existing literature about obstacles encountered in the operationalization of ECOWAS 
missions. In this regard, the study explores potential factors that caused ECOWAS to be 
supplanted in the Malian case. 
ECOWAS’s actions were uniquely articulated around political dimensions of the 
crisis, such as negotiating with Bamako about the transfer of power from the junta to 
civilian authorities, negotiating with rebel jihadists, and proposing resolutions for 
intervention to the UN Security Council. Virtually none of these actions scored major 
success. At Bamako, power remained in the hands of the military. Negotiations with the 
rebel jihadists were fruitless because rebels were only looking to gain time. The 
                                                 
1 Mohamed Belmakki, “African Sub-regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: The 
Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS)” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2005), abstract, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/2319/
05Mar_Belmakki.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
2 Cyril I. Obi, “Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing 
Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D’Ivoire,” African Security 2, no. 2–3 
(2009): 1, doi:10.1080/19362200903361945. 
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intervention resolutions submitted to the UN Security Council were also rejected three 
times by this body, which found them not accurate enough. Indeed, points 17 and 18 of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2056 indicated that the Council took note of 
the deployment permission submitted by ECOWAS and was ready to further consider the 
request as soon as it received more details on the objectives, means, and modalities of the 
proposed deployment.3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
If literature about the deficiency and limits of ECOWAS exists, academic works 
about the reasons ECOWAS did not intervene promptly and decisively to help Malian 
forces in their fight against rebel jihadist are not prolific. The recent timing of the event 
may play into that. From the existing literature on ECOWAS, two main tendencies seem 
to emerge in the analysis of its deficiency and limits to fully play its role. 
First, some scholars argue that there is a difference between ECOWAS’s official 
positions and the actual reasons for intervention in crises in West African states. That is 
Fredrick Söderbaum, Rodrigo Tavares, James J. Hentz, and Cyril I. Obi’s point of view. 
These authors explain that there are unofficial triggers for intervention, which are different 
from rhetorical statements about human security protection. The unofficial triggers for 
intervention lay in national interests or personal linkages between the leaders. Thus, 
whether regional or sub-regional, Africa’s security organizations are more about 
“sovereign boosting.”4 Equally, the likelihood of intervention is increased if the local 
hegemon favors it. 
James J. Hentz argues that, “in general, national interests underwrite regional 
actions.”5 So, what can be national interests of ECOWAS members? According to Hentz, 
                                                 
3 “Document Officiel Des Nations Unies.” United Nations, accessed July 24, 2018, http://www.un.org/
fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2056(2012). 
4 James J. Hentz, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Rodrigo Tavares. “Regional Organizations and African 
Security: Moving the Debate Forward,” African Security 2, no. 2–3 (2009): 206, doi:10.1080/
19362200903362109; meaning to support an ally or to promote one’s own prestige and the reputation of 
the military, rather than “responsibility to protect.”    
5 Ibid., 212. 
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national interests can be to demonstrate to the broader community that a given state actor 
is a meaningful player, to prevent turmoil from spreading, or a reaction to humanitarian 
crisis like refugee flows. The argument of national interest determining intervention falls 
apart in the test case of the Malian crisis. Most or all of the states in the sub-region had a 
national interest in stopping the growing threat of rebel jihadists because of the risk of 
contagion. In effect, the same ethnic groups, Touareg, on whose behalf jihadist rebels 
symbolize their fight, exist in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, Algeria, and Senegal. 
Neither the sub-regional organization nor individual states undertook an intervention 
initiative, however. The national interest incentive seems to be insufficient in prompting 
intervention in the referred case. Therefore, although national interest may explain some 
cases of involvement, it does not fully shed light on the enigma of the Malian case, which 
called for the direct action of the former colonizer. 
Personal relationships offer another potential explanation, since the personalization 
of politics is a reality in Africa. Empathy or animosity between heads of state dictate the 
conduct of their respective foreign policies toward each other. Hentz draws an example of 
this fact from the crisis in Liberia, where intervention occurred more for Liberian state 
security than human security. In the Liberian case, the friendship between Babangida, 
President of Nigeria, and Samuel Doe, President of Liberia, justified ECOWAS’s 
intervention in the latter country. In effect, at least 80 percent of Economic Community of 
West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops and 90 percent of 
the funding during the military intervention were provided by Nigeria.6 Similarly, 
Houphouet Boigny, President of Cote d’Ivoire, supported Charles Taylor, leader of the 
rebellion National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), because President Doe failed to 
prevent the murder of his adopted daughter’s spouse, Adolphus Tolbert. Adekeye Adebajo 
observes that the intertwinement of personal linkages has influenced the dynamics of the 
Liberian crisis and ultimately led to its end “with the successful Nigerian policy of 
rapprochement with the NPFL.”7 
                                                 
6 Obi, “Economic Community of West African States on the Ground,” 121–122. 
7 Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 67. 
5 
Personal linkage is key in understanding the idiosyncratic policy choices of most 
African heads of state. There are some limits to that approach, however. When the Malian 
crisis began, many countries in the sub-region had acquired new leaders, thanks to the 
democratic elections or regime change. It is therefore improbable that the Malian president 
had developed any kind of personal linkage with them and vice versa. 
Other scholars, like Joăo Gomes Cravinho and Adekeye Adebajo, identify a lack of 
resources as one of the main factors rendering African regional organizations ill-equipped 
to act alone and stabilize hotspots on the continent. Cravinho argues, “African regional 
organizations have a significant opportunity to consolidate and develop their vision of 
peace and stability on the continent, but in general they still lack the depth of resources and 
experience to act alone.”8 The author sees the European Union as a decisive partner for 
filling this gap. Although this argument is compelling at first sight, it is not specific about 
the resources or capabilities that African regional organizations lack or about the extent of 
the problem. In addition, if material resources like financial assets are the reason for 
inaction, it is worth noting that no organization, the UN included, can claim to have 
sufficient resources to fulfil all commitments. That is why, coming out of Cold War 
configuration and acknowledging that most states lacked sufficient funds to respond to 
crises alone, states promoted the creation of regional and sub-regional organizations to take 
care of regional security issues. 
The concern of Adekeye Adebajo about resources and equipment was valuable in 
helping to explain earlier episode of ECOWAS intervention, specifically in the Liberian 
crisis, where the institution adopted an ad hoc operation. Since then, however, a lot of water 
has flowed under the bridge. First, ECOWAS institutionalized a real security mechanism 
with the signature of the Protocol Relating to Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security in December 1999. Second, 
ECOWAS intervened and so experienced several crisis management episodes, in Sierra 
Leone, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire. With 1999’s Protocol, ECOWAS is supposed to have a 
                                                 
8 João Gomes Cravinho. “Regional Organizations in African Security: A Practitioners View,” African 
Security 2, no. 2–3 (2009): 193, doi:10.1080/19362200903362091. 
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standby, multipurpose force, composed of elements from member states of the 
organization, permanently stationed in their respective countries and ready for immediate 
deployment. Therefore, they should have the resources and equipment needed to intervene 
in situations like the Malian crisis. Consequently, this explanation also seems insufficient. 
D. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: LACK OF TRUST AND INTERNAL 
INSTABILITY 
Current literature about ECOWAS’s way of managing crises in the Western Africa 
sub-region summarizes factors that might impede its responsiveness and effectiveness as, 
first, personal politics; second, national interests; and third, insufficient capacity. Although 
there may be reasons to doubt the applicability of these hypotheses to the Malian case, they 
still have some merits. Knowing that there are unofficial triggers behind official speech, 
and that interventions of the sub-regional arrangement is more about national interest and 
sovereign boosting than real responsibility to protect, are clues that help to figure out states’ 
perception of each other and of the organization per se. 
An alternative explanation for the delay in ECOWAS’s response is the lack of trust. 
Very likely, Mali did not fully place its trust in ECOWAS. That is evidenced by the fact 
that from the beginning to the climax of the Malian crisis, authorities in Bamako have 
always prohibited the presence of ECOWAS troops in the capital city. Therefore, mistrust 
within the organization, as evidenced by the target state resistance and restrictions on troop 
deployment, is another hypothesis explaining why ECOWAS failed in taking the lead for 
the settlement of the crisis in Mali. 
By considering the sub-regional environment when the war broke out in Mali, one 
can realize that the whole place was at a boil and that most of the states faced internal 
security challenges. Leaders’ legitimacy in keys states was contested and there were 
insurgencies in many places. In Cote d’Ivoire, a ten-year civil war was reaching 
denouement with the dislodgement of Laurent Gbagbo and the installation of Alassane 
Dramane Ouattara as president. There were Boko Haram insurrections in Nigeria. Senegal 
was turning the page on a tumultuous presidential election. Guinea Conakry was also 
experiencing a profound crisis after the death of President Lassana Conte. Leaders were 
7 
facing internal dilemmas that might have reduced their margin of maneuver to be more 
decisive and conclusive in the Malian crisis. Therefore, distraction by internal instability is 
the fifth hypothesis explaining why ECOWAS did not take the lead in the settlement of the 
crisis in Mali. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis investigates more deeply these potential explanations to understand why 
ECOWAS leaders did not take the lead role in addressing the Malian crisis. In proceeding 
with this research project, I will first test previous authors’ arguments to see whether 
personal politics, national interests, and insufficient capacity can also explain ECOWAS’s 
role in the Malian case. If they do not apply to the Malian case, those explanations could 
be less viable.  
In the absence of available data about personal linkage between former President 
Amadou Toumani Toure and his peers within the sub-region, I will conduct a general 
observation on the quality of the relationship between Mali and neighboring ECOWAS 
member states. If the relationship status looked good at the time, this would mean that the 
personal politics argument could not explain ECOWAS’s slow intervention. 
Talking about national interest, I will evaluate whether the crisis in Mali threatened 
neighboring countries’ national security. If ECOWAS’s members had an interest in Mali’s 
stability, but that it did not prompt those countries’ intervention, then the argument about 
national interest falls apart. 
Approaching the previous authors’ last point about the lack of capacity for 
ECOWAS to carry alone the mission of security in its jurisdiction, I will present 
ECOWAS’s capacity improvement over time in the institutional dimension and the lessons 
it has learned from field experiences. 
In the investigation process, I will refer to journalistic sources such as online news 
articles, media reporting, and official reports. I will also consult secondary sources like 
journal articles and books. 
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After having tested the existing arguments, I will examine the two alternative 
explanations to enhance understanding of ECOWAS’s failure to act quickly in the Malian 
case. To do so, I will rely upon journalistic sources, specifically the ones that have covered 
critical phases of political interaction between authorities in Bamako and the ECOWAS 
organization, and officials’ most important declarations. Through similar sources, I will 
also try to find out ongoing or recent internal troubles within other ECOWAS member 
states. Before tackling the research question, however, it will be wise, in first, to do a brief 
overview of ECOWAS’s history in order to set the scene and give more background to 
readers. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis intends to shed light on factors that may have prevented ECOWAS from 
being the lead actor in resolving the Malian crisis in 2012. After this introductory chapter, 
I will present an overview of ECOWAS’s genesis and evolution in Chapter II, to give more 
background to readers and set the scene. This second chapter will also give me the 
opportunity to present some instances of ECOWAS intervention in order to highlight 
similarities or differences with the Malian case. Chapter III will be dedicated to presenting 
the Malian crisis. In Chapter IV, I will test previous authors’ hypotheses and my own 
explanations in the Malian case. In the conclusion, I will provide recommendations on how 
to improve ECOWAS’s effectiveness and responsiveness for future crises.  
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II. ECOWAS HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
After achieving independence, the states of the West African sub-region wanted to 
reconnect with their past of unity through regionalism. Two trends emerged: a maximalist 
tendency towards unity through the transfer of important sovereign powers of the states to 
a regional integration organization and a minimalist tendency, which promoted 
rapprochement between states through agreements in specific areas of activity. In other 
words, the minimalist trend supported the view that integration, as an end state, would be 
reached progressively by bringing the new independent states closer through economics 
and technical cooperation. The maximalist tendency failed quickly because of the self-
interest of some states with respect to their own development advantage and because of 
external interference. The minimalist trend was relatively more successful. The treaty 
establishing ECOWAS was signed on May 28, 1975, at Lagos in this context. Originally 
conceived and designed as an economic integration organization, ECOWAS soon mutated 
to embrace the security and political dimensions. 
A. THE DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL CONSOLIDATION IN WEST AFRICA  
To understand the integrative dynamic of the West African region, one needs to 
recall its history. West Africa was the cradle of many empires: kingdoms whose radiance 
spanned through the ages. The most illustrious among those political entities were as 
follows: the Empire of Ghana (3rd–13th centuries), the Empire of Mali (13th–15th 
centuries), and the Songhay Empire (15th–16th centuries). Divided ever since because of 
different colonial experiences, the newly independent West African states returned to 
historical patterns of forming again great political ensembles. The attempt to revisit 
regionalism was evinced by the increasing regional integration initiatives and agreements 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The living experience of the precolonial era, coupled 
with territorial, economic, and demographic handicaps inherited from colonization, made 
10 
the realization of unity9 through regional integration an appropriate roadmap for the West 
African states engaged in the process of acquiring their independence. Thus, several 
regrouping initiatives were born. 
A federal project, regrouping Dahomey (Benin), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), 
Senegal and Soudan (Mali), was initiated during the Conférence of Bamako held on 
December 29 and 30, 1958. In 1959, however, Dahomey and Upper Volta, influenced by 
France and Ivory Coast, rejected the federation’s constitution. The federation was therefore 
reduced to Soudan and Senegal. On April 4, 1960, the Federal Assembly elected Leopold 
Sedar Senghor as its president and Modibo Keita as its Chief Executive. After the birth of 
the Federation of Mali, however, divergences arose between its leaders and resulted in the 
Federation’s implosion on August 20, 1960. 
Another federal initiative was the creation of the Union of African States, 
sometimes called the Union Ghana-Guinea-Mali. The union started with Ghana and 
Guinea, on May 1, 1959; Mali then joined on December 24, 1960. The Union, which was 
the first of its kind to bring together a British colony and French colonies, aimed to develop 
among its members a common currency and a unified foreign policy. Since the Union had 
neither an administration nor permanent meetings, none of its proposals were implemented. 
No other states joined the union, even though it was opened to all independent states in 
Africa. The Union disbanded in 1963. 
B. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS A PROGRESSIVE 
VECTOR FOR INTEGRATION 
Besides the integration initiatives that have maximal political ambition for unity, 
meaning huge transfers of sovereignty from states to the regional integration organization, 
states pursued agreements of technical and economic cooperation that aimed to create 
partnerships between countries in some specific domain of activities. ECOWAS became 
the successor of the following Conventions: the Convention of the Western African 
                                                 
9 Another word for unity will be the achievement of Pan-Africanism ideology. Pan-Africanism is a 
philosophical concept representing African history, culture, arts, and sciences. Pan-Africanism pursues the 
goal of protecting African civilization through the unification of all continental Africa. 
11 
Customs Union (signed at Paris on June 9, 1959), the Convention of West African 
Economic and Customs Union (signed at Abidjan on June 6, 1966), and the West African 
Economic Community (signed at Abidjan on April 17, 1973). 
The 1959 Convention between Côte d’Ivoire, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Mauritania, 
Niger, and the Federation of Mali (the Sudan and Senegal) had been intended to establish 
a total customs union, which extended to the entry and exit charges levied on goods and 
merchandise coming from or destined for those states. Although a laudable initiative in the 
economic cooperation policy between the member states of the Union, the mechanism put 
in place by this convention has proven to be ineffective. Indeed, a total customs union could 
not be based on the fragile foundations at the time and between countries still under 
construction, not to mention the fact that the members did not find an agreement for the 
distribution of the customs revenue collected on imports. This convention, therefore, never 
had a real application because the obstacles to the free movement of goods were frequent 
and the many violations eventually rendered it ineffective. The West African Economic 
and Customs Community replaced the customs union in June 1966 with the same 
membership. It established a trade and economic integration area in the region. This 
regional cooperation establishment lacked vigor and its achievements were negligible 
compared to the expectations. Similar problems persisted in varying degrees in the 
conventions that followed it, despite the advent of ECOWAS. 
C. THE BIRTH OF ECOWAS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF WEST 
AFRICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
In Lagos in 1975, 16 West African states consented to reinforce further their link 
through the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The 
signatories of ECOWAS insisted that 
It shall be the aim of the Community to promote co-operation and 
development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of 
industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and 
cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its 
peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering 
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closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and 
development of the African continent.10 
In order to achieve such goals, the Community, by stages, was expected to ensure 
the elimination of trade barriers between member states; the establishment of a uniform 
customs tariff and commercial policy towards third countries; the promotion of freedom of 
movements for peoples, services, and capital within the Community space; the 
implementation of common schemes for the development of equipment and transportation 
infrastructures; and the elimination of disparities in the levels of development.11 
Indeed, the ultimate goal of the Heads of States and Governments who signed the 
ECOWAS creation treaty was to accelerate and sustain the member states’ economic 
development, especially by suppressing obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital, 
and people. That said, West African integration would be realized through the creation of 
a common market that also would be a growth engine reducing disparities in the level of 
developments among the sub-region countries. The U.S. State Department correctly 
observes that 
ECOWAS was conceived as a means toward economic integration and 
development intended to lead to the eventual establishment of an economic 
union in West Africa, enhancing economic stability and enhancing relations 
between member states. In actuality, ECOWAS was an attempt to overcome 
the isolation of most West African countries following the colonial period 
and the period of post-independence nationalism.12 
If 1975 reflected the state of mind that West African regional integration should 
come primarily from economic bases, in the following decades ECOWAS evolved to adapt 
to contemporary challenges. The regional organization’s mandate changed de facto before 
it changed de jure, however. 
                                                 
10 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Concluded at Lagos on 28 
May 1975. No 14843, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5560. 
11 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
12 “Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),” U.S. Department of State, November 
22, 2002, https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/22519.htm. 
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D. THE MUTATION OF ECOWAS TO EMBRACE A SECURITY 
DIMENSION 
The regional organization changed its mandate to embrace a security dimension in 
1993, through the revision of the ECOWAS founding treaty. It is important to stress, 
however, that the process had been under way ever since the realities of the sub-region 
demanded it. The milestones for this revision were already poised. In effect, less than a 
year after ECOWAS’s establishment, the heads of State of Nigeria and Togo proposed a 
defense treaty, from which emerged the Protocol of Non-aggression two years later. This 
Protocol was signed in Lagos on April 22, 1978. The preamble of this succinct document, 
just six articles long, recognized that ECOWAS “cannot attain its objectives save in an 
atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member States of the 
Community.”13 The protocol committed the states of the community to refraining from 
any use of force for the settlement of their disputes and to privilege the voices of peaceful 
settlements. In the event of failure to settle the crises between member states peacefully, 
co-litigants should refer to a Committee of the Authority. The Protocol’s Article 5 ends by 
stating that, “in the event of failure of settlement by the aforementioned Committee the 
dispute shall finally go to the Authority.”14 As a preventive measure against any use of 
force to destabilize one another, the member states must refrain from committing, 
supporting, or tolerating any attempt against the territorial integrity or independence of 
another member state. Thus, acknowledging the challenge of internal stability regarding 
African security, the protocol of non-aggression regulated relations within ECOWAS in a 
way that prevents and prohibits member states from engaging in subversive activities 
towards each other. The protocol created an institutional layering to prevent conflicts 
among and within member states. 
Following the Protocol of Non-aggression, ECOWAS member states signed 
another separate agreement in 1981: the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of 
                                                 





Defense. This second agreement, signed at Freetown on May 29, 1981, starts from the 
premise that economic progress, as intended with the creation of ECOWAS, “cannot be 
achieved unless the conditions for the necessary security are ensured in all Member States 
of the Community.”15 In other words, economic progress will be achieved only if member 
states of the community get a sort of insurance and coverage against, this time, outside 
security threats. The state of mind of the moment seriously considered threats of aggression 
on the African continent, in general, and on the states of the community, in particular, with 
the presence of foreign forces and bases within the continent. In this context, to support 
countries’ national efforts in taking charge of their respective national security, ECOWAS 
offered mutual assistance for a greater effectiveness in a framework of a collective defense. 
To this end, the Protocol states in Article 2 that, “Member States declare and accept that 
any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat 
or aggression against the entire Community.”16 As such, ECOWAS’s member states 
committed themselves to providing to one another mutual aid and assistance for defense in 
the case of armed threat or aggression against a member state. According to the provisions 
of the Protocol of 1981, especially its Articles 4, 16, 17, and 18, the Allied Armed Forces 
of the Community (AAFC)—ECOWAS’s envisaged command intervention force created 
by combining the Organization member states’ national forces—will intervene in two 
possible situations. First, it can intervene when all peaceful efforts to settle a dispute—
routes provided by Article 5 of the 1978 Protocol of Non-aggression as well as the 
community authority efforts of mediation—have failed. Secondly, they can intervene at the 
request of the head of the state that is a victim of aggression. In this case, the request for 
assistance, addressed to the Authority’s chairperson with copies to other members, means 
that the Authority is “duly notified and that the AAFC are placed under a state of 
emergency.”17 
                                                 
15 Economic Community of West African States Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence. 
Concluded at Freetown on 29 May 1981, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/
3827~v~Protocole_d_Assistance_Mutuelle_en_matiere_de_Defense.pdf. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Economic Community of West African States Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence.  
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Basically, the Protocol on Mutual Defense, as the complement to the Protocol on 
Non-aggression, pursued three additional objectives: preventing and responding to external 
aggression; managing intra-ECOWAS conflicts; and countering internal armed conflicts 
that are supported and maintained by foreign actors, whether internal or external to 
ECOWAS. In the case of external aggression, member states would provide mutual aid and 
assistance in defense. 
These two important Protocols, of 1978 and 1981, place equal emphasis on threats 
from outside and inside, including domestic splits. This is apparent in Article 4 of the 1981 
Protocol relating to the mutual assistance of defense, which states that ECOWAS is 
compelled to intervene in “internal armed conflict within any member state engineered and 
supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire 
Community.”18 The focus on countering outside influence on domestic conflicts is easily 
understandable in the sense that internal armed conflicts are unlikely to prosper and 
threaten regional peace unless supported by the outside. 
These security measures were, to some extent, flawed, as they could not be used to 
address exclusively intra-state conflicts. Nevertheless, it should be known that, at this 
stage, the concern of the regional organization was not oriented to deal with the origin of 
domestic political disputes; rather, the objective was to contain disturbances. To contain 
threats from inside—specifically, domestic opposition—however, the most effective tool 
is naturally to improve governance. That is why it is accurate to say that the answers to 
defense and security questions are not only military, but also political. ECOWAS adopted 
this approach for the first time in its Declaration of Political Principles (Abuja, July 6, 
1991). This Declaration affirms the member states’ attachment to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, as well as their willingness to promote political pluralism and 
representative institutions in each country. ECOWAS, therefore, added a political 
dimension, as well as a security dimension, to its initial economic mandate. 
The expansion of ECOWAS’s mandate to military matters, through the 1978 and 
1981 protocols, facilitated the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)’s deployment to 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
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Liberia in 1990, at the request of Liberian President Samuel Doe, who had faced a rebellion 
led by Charles Taylor since December 1981.19 This deployment was notably ECOWAS’s 
first military experience in an operation theater. ECOMOG, a multinational force, was set 
up on an ad hoc basis for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. As provided by 
the Protocols of 1978 and 1981, the failure of peaceful solutions, including a proposal for 
a ceasefire, propelled ECOWAS’s decision body—the Authority—to create an 
intervention force to impose a ceasefire between the two fighting factions of Samuel Doe 
and Charles Taylor. The ECOWAS Conference of Heads of State and Government 
approved the deployment of the ECOMOG troops, mostly from Nigeria, in November 
1990.20 It is important to note that, when deploying, the intervention force did not have 
any mandate from the UN. The first UN Security Council resolution on Liberia was issued 
on January 22, 1991, to endorse the ECOWAS-sponsored peace initiative.21 
Finally, at Cotonou, on July 14, 1993, ECOWAS members signed a revision to their 
founding treaty that adopted statutes related to the new realities. Chapter 10 of the revised 
treaty integrated the security dimension. Point 2 of Article 52, contained in Chapter 10, 
binds the member states that have signed the previous Protocols and the Declaration of 
Political Principles of the Community to cooperate with a view to achieving those security 
and political objectives. 
The revised Treaty of 1993 represented the turning point for ECOWAS by 
reformulating both its goals and missions. The said reform incorporated security and 
politics within the aims of the organization, for the purpose of peace and security, 
guarantors of harmonious development. For these purposes, member states must co-operate 
with the community, in the context of the prevention and the timely resolution of interstate 
                                                 
19 ECOMOG was the first multinational peacekeeping/peace enforcement force to be established by a 
regional body. 
20 “1990–2003: Comment La Guerre Au Liberia a Fait Rentrer La Cedeao Dans Une Nouvelle 
Dimension [1990–2003 : How The War In Liberia Made Ecowas Come Into A New 
Dimension]”JeuneAfrique. December 16, 2016, accessed March 30, 2018, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/
384287/politique/1990-2003-guerre-liberia-a-rentrer-cedeao-nouvelle-dimension/. 
21 “Libéria: Derrière Le Chaos, Crises Et Interventions Internationales [Liberia: Behind Chaos, 
International Crises and Interventions],” Home, accessed March 30, 2018, https://www.msf-crash.org/fr/
publications/guerre-et-humanitaire/liberia-derriere-le-chaos-crises-et-interventions. 
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or intrastate conflicts, through periodic consultations, the use of measures to settle 
peacefully their disputes, the establishment of a regional observatory for peace and security 
and, where appropriate, the establishment of peacekeeping forces. In addition, the revised 
treaty refers to the relevant protocols with regard to political cooperation, regional peace, 
and stability. 
In 1999, ECOWAS members adopted the Protocol on Mechanism for Prevention, 
Management, Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. This Protocol gives a 
permanent statute to the ECOMOG force by stating that it is a force whose elements are in 
their respective countries of origin and ready to be deployed as soon as possible (Article 
21), its missions (Article 22), and its financing arrangements (Article 36).  
In summary, multiple political crises22 occurred in the West African sub-region in 
the decades following ECOWAS’s creation, challenging the focus of ECOWAS’s 
founding treaty. These events contributed to a shift in the organization’s initial mandate. 
The community, henceforth, aware that economic development is difficult to achieve in a 
context of insecurity and lack of peace, devised successive legal instruments to manage the 
emerging political challenges in the area. ECOWAS, henceforth, would aim not only to 
foster interstate economy but also to strengthen their political and military cooperation. 
Prior to the revision of ECOWAS’s founding text, however, the community had already 
intervened in the Liberian crisis of 1990. Beyond its diplomatic action, the Community 
created an intervention force that it deployed to Liberia, even before having a mandate 
from the UN. 
  
                                                 
22 Internal crisis in Liberia but also experiences of interstate wars, like wars that opposed Mali to 
Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). 
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III. THE MALIAN CRISIS 
In January 2012, the insurgency of armed groups in the north of Mali made the 
country experience the worst crisis in its post-colonial history. The Republic of Mali had 
known previous insurrections and had been somewhat successful in containing them. Over 
time, however, Libyan influence enabled the armed groups to gain in vigor as well as in 
proficiency in asymmetric and psychological warfare, until they achieved a balance of 
forces vis-à-vis the Malian army or even a clear overtaking. 
The turning point of change in the balance of power was in 2012, when armed 
groups—the ones motivated to gain independence of the so-called Azawad and the others 
desiring to turn Mali into an Islamic state—took advantage of opportunities offered in the 
Libyan crisis. In this regard, the complication of the 2012 Malian crisis stemmed from 
features such as the ease of access to armaments both from Libyan magazines and other 
sources, the imbrication of diverse insurgent groups (rebels, jihadists, smugglers), and the 
thinly veiled support of the Sarkozy regime to the secessionists’ enterprise.23 The 
insurgents have successfully attacked the positions of the Malian army several times. The 
most tragic event occurred in Aguel’hoc. On January 24, 2012, the garrison of Aguel’hoc, 
home to the 713th Nomadic Company, fell short of ammunition and food, after a week of 
combat with insurgents. The insurgents coldly killed hundreds of military prisoners, 
employing atrocious techniques like beheading and summary executions of disarmed 
                                                 
23 “Rébellion Touarègue: Pourquoi Le Mali Suspecte La France De Jouer Double Jeu [Tuareg 
Rebellion: Why Mali Suspects France to Play Double Game],” JeuneAfrique. March 09, 2012, accessed 
April 08, 2018, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/177046/politique/r-bellion-touar-gue-pourquoi-le-mali-
suspecte-la-france-de-jouer-double-jeu/; In effect, concerning this last point, unlike ECOWAS and the 
African Union, which immediately condemned the insurgency in Mali, France, under the Sarkozy 
administration, never openly denounced this state of fact. Moreover, as fierce fighting took place in 
northern Mali, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé declared on February 7, 2012, in front of the French 
Senate, “La rébellion touarègue a remporté récemment d’importants succès militaires au Nord du fleuve 
Niger...Un cessez-le-feu immédiat est pour nous impératif. [The Tuareg rebellion has recently won major 
military victories north of the Niger River.…An immediate cease-fire is imperative for us].” Juppé’s 
troubling statement, which at the edge praises rebel aggression against a legitimate government forces, had 
led some to advance the idea of a compromise between France and Touareg rebel fighters who came from 
Libya to disengage their support to Kaddafi with the promise of France’s help in their claims in Mali. 
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soldiers, acts that are qualifiables as war crimes.24 French Minister of Cooperation, Henri 
de Raincourt, qualified the tragic event in the terms of “des violences absolument atroces 
et inadmissibles [absolutely atrocious and inadmissible violence]”25 committed against 
hundreds of Malian soldiers, who were captured and coldly executed.  
The atrocities, described above, committed against the Malian military in the north 
provoked a mood change in the south, resulting in a blow against the regime in place. The 
disorder destroyed the command and control in the army and precipitated the fall of the 
entire northern area whose population then suffered martyrdom for thirteen months at the 
hands of armed groups until French President François Hollande decided to intervene 
militarily in January 2013. It was only then that ECOWAS also intervened. 
The first section of this chapter analyzes Libya’s influence on Mali; the second 
makes a presentation of the Malian military’s defeat by the insurgents; the last section 
discusses the coup d’état and its repercussions. 
A. LIBYA’S INFLUENCE ON MALI 
The Libyan crisis of 2011, with regard to the particularity of the overthrown regime 
and the nature of the war itself, had the greatest impact on the region’s equilibrium and 
strategic stability. Other major crises in the North African region did not occasion 
equivalent consequences. For example, the Algerian crisis of the 1990s had not overflowed 
among the neighbors despite the extreme violence that characterized it. The Tunisian 
revolution, in 2011, also had little strategic impact on the region.26 
                                                 
24 Jeune Afrique, “Guerre Au Mali: Retour Sur Le Drame D’Aguelhok – JeuneAfrique.com [War In 
Mali: Back On The Aguelhok Drama], ” JeuneAfrique. i, October 21, 2013, accessed August 31, 2018, 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/167687/politique/guerre-au-mali-retour-sur-le-drame-d-aguelhok/. 
25 “Bataille D’Aguel’hoc: Il Y a 5 Ans, Le MNLA Et Ses Alliés Terroristes égorgeaient Des Soldats 
Maliens [Battle of Aguel'hoc: 5 Years Ago, MNLA and Terrorist Allies Slaughter Malian Soldiers],” 
Maliweb.net, January 29, 2017, accessed August 26, 2018, https://www.maliweb.net/la-situation-politique-
et-securitaire-au-nord/bataille-daguelhoc-y-a-5-ans-mnla-allies-terroristes-egorgeaient-soldats-maliens-
2017122.html. 
26 Flavien Bourrat, “L’impact De La Crise Libyenne Sur Les Autres Pays Du Maghreb [The impact of 
the Libyan crisis on other Maghreb countries],” 2013-N˚27, 38. 
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Kaddafi’s overthrowing impacted the Sahel-Saharan region, in general, and directly 
impacted the national security of Mali, in particular, because of his historical influence and 
the armaments proliferation that followed. In effect, the erosion of the Libyan state with all 
its power resources, combined with the porosity of borders in the Sahel, the lack of state 
control in parts of Malian national territory, and the presence of groups of all kinds 
(terrorists, irredentists, smugglers) in those areas were an explosive cocktail par excellence 
for Mali. 
1. Libya’s Historical Influence on Mali 
Without a doubt, Libya in Kaddafi’s time was a regional power in North Africa and 
exerted a real influence on the politics of states in the Sahel region. This influence is 
reflected in Flavien Bourrat’s27 writing that Libya’s neighbors feared “l’activisme et les 
ingérences extérieures d’un régime musclé, doté de gros moyens financiers et incarné par 
un dirigeant fantasque et imprévisible [the activism and external interference of a muscular 
regime, endowed with large financial means and incarnated by a whimsical and 
unpredictable leader].”28 For the Malian case, Libya’s influence goes back to the 80s when 
Kaddafi integrated Malian Touareg fighters in his Islamic legion. In effect, successive 
droughts, at this time, led Touareg young men to migrate to places like Libya. There, they 
were integrated in combat legions and exposed to revolutionary discourses.29 
The integration of young Touareg combatants in Kaddafi’s Islamic legion ensured 
him the allegiance of the Touareg,30 as it offered the latter the possibility of acquiring a 
greater fighting ability. The hardening of those fighters, who previously served the projects 
                                                 
27 Flavien Bourrat is Program Manager at the Military School’s Strategic Research Institute on the 
North Africa-Middle East region. 
28 Bourrat. “L’impact De La Crise Libyenne Sur Les Autres Pays Du Maghreb [The impact of the 
Libyan crisis on other Maghreb countries],” 2013-N˚27, 38. 
29 Tor A. Benjaminsen, “Does Supply-Induced Scarcity Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel? 
The Case of the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 6 (2008): 819–36, 
doi:10.1177/0022343308096158, 819. 
30 For example, on April 9, 2006, during his visit in Mali, Kaddafi abandoned the Malian president on 
their way to Tombouctou. He wanted to be welcomed alone by the population there. Moreover, he received 
under his tent Hassan Ag Fagaga, a touareg rebel. One month later, in May 23, 2006, Fagaga launched his 
attack against the Malian military. 
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of Kaddafi in Chad, Lebanon, and elsewhere, was felt in the 1990s rebellion that infamous 
individuals such as Iyad Ag Ali and Ag Najim launched when they returned to Mali from 
Libya. Having this influence on the Touareg communities, the Libyan regime had a 
political lever on Mali, of which the ruler did not deprive himself. According to Yves 
Lacoste, Kaddafi considered “all the borders dividing Saharan land as completely 
spurious.”31 As such, he pushed the Touareg of Algeria, Mali, and Niger to unite, and 
supported their revolt.32 Thus, in April 2006, in Timbuktou, Kaddafi announced the 
creation of the Popular and Social League of the Great Sahara Tribes, which registered the 
adherence of Malian Touareg communities desiring independence. In fact, this initiative 
was part of Kaddafi’s much broader ambition of unifying the continent around his 
Jamahiriya.33 If the Libya of Kaddafi made its neighbors afraid about being destabilized, 
as Bourrat wrote, the fall of Kaddafi’s regime did not have less destabilizing effect with 
regard to the armaments there and the porosity of frontiers in the Sahel. 
2. The Influence of Kaddafi’s Overthrow 
Libya had one of the largest and most diverse armament stockpiles in the region, 
allowing the country to equip friendly governments and rebel groups not only across the 
continent,34 but also in other theaters, like Lebanon. With the fall of the regime and the 
chaotic situation that ensued, this impressive arsenal of war fell into the control of rebel 
leaders. The armed groups took advantage of this situation to seize the weapons before 
retreating from the area subject to NATO intervention. William Lawrence, director of the 
North African region for the International Crisis Group (ICG), explains that “une quantité 
considérable d’armes a été volée durant la révolution. Il y en a des légères, comme des 
Kalachnikovs, mais aussi des mitrailleuses lourdes, des lance-roquettes et des missiles sol-
                                                 
31 Yves Lacoste, “Sahara, Perspectives Et Illusions Géopolitiques [Sahara, Perspectives And 
Geopolitical Illusions],” Hérodote 142, no. 3 (2011): 12, doi:10.3917/her.142.0012, 9. 
32 Lacoste, “Sahara, Perspectives Et Illusions Géopolitiques [Sahara, Geopolitical Perspectives And 
Illusions],” 9. 
33 Jamahiriya is an Arabic term meaning state of the masses. 
34 Support for the Polisario against Morocco in the 1980s, successive support for Toubou (Chadian 
nomads in the Tibesti region) against the Chadian government from the 1970s until 1987 when Kaddafi 
decided to directly invade the north of Chad with Libyan armored vehicles, to name only those. 
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air de type SAM. Des stocks de grenades et d’explosifs, dont du Semtex, ont également 
disparu [a considerable amount of weapons was stolen during the revolution. There are 
light ones, like Kalashnikovs, but also heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, and SAM-
type surface-to-air missiles. Stockpiles of grenades and explosives, including Semtex, have 
also disappeared].”35 Yet, the Libyan arsenal was no longer the only one available in 
Libya. In addition, France had dropped tons of arms to the rebels, supposedly to allow them 
to defend themselves against Kaddafi loyalists’ breakthrough. Jean-Christophe Notin, a 
French historian, novelist, and documentary filmmaker, asserts that forty tons of armament, 
including Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers, and explosives, were parachuted by French 
aviation to insurgents.36 He goes on to advance the idea that those weapons might have 
ended up in the hands of Libyan Islamist groups who could have given or sold them to 
fighters now active in the Sahel. 
Overall, Kaddafi’s regime was influential in Malian politics because it provided 
significant support, in terms of training, to Touareg groups who would be involved in 
successive insurgencies in the north of Mali, including the 2012 one. The fall of his regime 
provided extensive arms to insurgent groups whose return to Mali preceded the 
unprecedented insurgency that overwhelmed the capabilities of the Malian national army. 
B. THE INSURRECTIONAL LEAGUE DEFEATING MALIAN MILITARY 
Since January 2012, Malian forces have been overwhelmed by the assaults of 
insurgents who were constituted as a league. Who were they? What did they want? What 
have been the consequences of their actions? This section gives those details. For the 
moment, the simple answers are as follows. The insurgents were the National Movement 
for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), constituted mainly of Touaregs; Ansar Dine, 
composed of Touaregs, Arabs, and members of Al Qaida in the Magreb (AQIM); and the 
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), a dissident group of AQIM 
                                                 
35 Luc Mathieu, “La Libye, Dépôt D’armes Jihadiste [Libya, Jihadist’ Armaments Depot],” 
Libération.fr. January 16, 2013, accessed April 03, 2018, http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2013/01/16/la-
libye-depot-d-armes-jihadiste_874596. 
36 Mathieu, “La Libye, Dépôt D’armes Jihadiste.”  
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composed of jihadists from diverse countries. NMLA fought for the independence of the 
region it calls Azawad: that is, the portion of the Malian national territory including 
Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal. Ansar Dine and the MOJWA were looking to establish sharia 
law in the country. 
The successive attacks of those armed groups on the Malian military and the 
atrocities they committed during their assaults led the Malian population to accuse the 
government of not giving sufficient combat equipment to the army. The grievances would 
finally result in the overthrowing of the regime by a group of mutineers who were in the 
garrison of Kati. 
1. The Insurgency 
Irredentist Touareg, grouped within the so-called NMLA that was created in 
October 2011, started an armed insurrection against the Malian military in January 2012. 
Not being representative of all Touareg and therefore having meager forces, NMLA allied 
with different armed groups present in the region such as AQIM, the MOJWA, Ansar Dine, 
and various criminal syndicates. 
The alliance or even the mix of the NMLA with terrorist groups and other criminal 
organizations, although denied by the Movement, is certain. Their association essentially 
rests on financial reasons, since “smugglers are known to pay large fees to Touareg for 
protection as they run drugs, fuel, arms, cigarettes and migrants across Touareg 
territory.”37 Scott Stewart, an American analyst of terrorism and security issues, suggests 
the idea of close associations between rebel leader Ibrahim Ag Bahanga38 and AQIM for 
financial reasons. Not only have smugglers paid fees to Touaregs, but also Touaregs 
themselves have kidnapped westerners and sold them to AQIM. Stewart reports that, “Ag 
Bahanga clearly appears to have been plugged into these smuggling networks and to have 
                                                 





38 Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who passed away since, was the cousin of NMLA’s leader Mohamed Ag 
Najim. 
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used them, along with the patronage of Gadhafi, to fund and support his rebel 
movement.”39 That is to say, rebels and terrorists had common interests and were members 
of the same insurrectional league that attacked Mali, even though initially NMLA’s goal 
was independence and the other terrorist groups wanted to establish sharia law in the 
country. Moreover, on Saturday, May 26, 2012, in Gao, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, 
spokesperson for the NMLA, announced the official merger of his militia with the Islamic 
Faction Army Ansar Dine, led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, in view of the forthcoming creation of 
the Islamic Republic of Azawad. 
On January 17, 2012, NMLA launched its first attacks on the Malian military 
garrison of Menaka, located in the Gao region in the northeastern part of the national 
territory. The attackers had to retreat from the intervention of Malian combat helicopters. 
The Malian Defense Minister’s statement on the incident reports one soldier and several 
assailants killed and several casualties.40 Almost simultaneously, an attack occurred 
against Aguelhoc and Tessalit, both located in Kidal region. Dozens of vehicles headed 
towards the military base of Aguelhoc prior to opening fire, first with light weapons, then 
with heavy weapons. In the course of events, it was unclear who controlled the city, but a 
government statement released on January 20, 2012 indicated that rebels had held Menaka, 
Aguelhoc, and Tessalit for a short period. The governmental declaration explains rebels’ 
brief siege in those cities by the delay in the arrival of reinforcement troops occasioned by 
poor road conditions and the country’s limited air assets.41 
In the following days, rebels, supported by jihadists, successfully cut off a supply 
convoy heading to the garrison, before attacking it on January 24 and forcing Malian 
troops, who ran out of ammunition, to abandon Aguelhoc. This withdrawal could also have 
been undertaken in order to redeploy force elements to Kidal to strengthen this city. Still, 
following the Malian troops’ retreat, strikes from the National Air Force on Aguelhoc 
would have resulted in the destruction of 40 rebel vehicles and the killing of dozens of 
                                                 




combatants.42 On January 25, government troops retook Aguelhoc. “Subsequent reports 
suggest control of Aguelhoc has passed back and forth more than once since then,” 
however.43 
The rebels pursued their armed assaults on the towns of Anderamboukane (in Gao 
region) and Lere (in Timbuktu region) on January 26. The modus operandi did not change. 
Stewart reports that, prior to NMLA’s incursion in Lere, military units had left the town 
already. Therefore, there was no resistance. After NMLA’s occupation of Lere, though, an 
army detachment headed toward it on January 28. The fog of war surrounded the 
confrontations, especially with respect to who was currently in control of the city.44 Other 
reports indicated that, on January 31, NMLA attacked Niafunke, in Timbuktu region, in 
the far west of northern Mali, and Ntilit in Gao region.45 
NMLA’s maneuver of mobility in important geographical scope was a simple, 
though smart, tactic, aiming to stretch to the maximum Malian forces across the vast desert 
north. The successive attacks of the insurgents and the atrocities they have committed on 
those occasions had impacts on both the troops’ morale and the nation’s feeling. 
2. The Consequences  
This war of harassment and the successive setbacks suffered by the military created 
a nationalist fervor among the Malian population, who began to accuse the government of 
not giving sufficient combat equipment to the army to retaliate for this national humiliation. 
Such problems are predictable when recalling this wisdom: “If a government fails to find 
creative ways to minimize friendly casualties and defeat an adversary, usually by inflicting 
heavy casualties on him, then it will usually, and quite justifiably, forfeit the confidence of 
its people.”46 Thus, there were street mobilizations in Segou and Bamako, followed by the 
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march of women in Kati, and finally a mutiny in Kati garrison on March 21, 2012, that 
resulted in the fall of the regime. On March 22, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo47 overthrew 
President Amadou Toumani Touré. This coup d’état, according to its perpetrators, aimed 
to put “an end to the incompetent regime of Amadou Toumani Toure.”48 
The military’s seizure of power was unexpected, not only for the Malian people 
and foreign governments, but also for the soldiers themselves who perpetrated the coup. 
Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, the chief of mutineers, conceded on TV5 in the first hours 
of the coup that, “au tout debut ce n’etait l’objectif recherché.”49 Therefore, what had been 
a mutiny for demanding better equipment, better living conditions for the benefit of 
soldiers, and “peace in the north” turned into a putsch. The unplanned character of this 
event already, as a clue, tells something about the ensuing management. 
The military who executed the coup were also low-ranking soldiers. They did not 
have any plan or agenda. As a consequence, the military chain of command was broken. 
That was, at the least, a confused situation for the military, which moreover has been 
subject to civil authority for about 20 years, thanks to the country’s experience of 
democracy. In any case, the coup had the greatest repercussion on the sequence of events, 
by literally precipitating the fall of the north. 
C. THE COUP AND THE FALL OF THE NORTH 
At this stage, it is important to recall that not all the military was associated with 
the coup. It was the mutiny of a handful of military living in the garrison of Kati. The coup 
created diplomatic problems, internal dissent, and structural problems within the military. 
Again, it marks the beginning of ECOWAS’s involvement in the management of the crisis. 
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1. Problems Emerged from the Coup 
The coup raised diplomatic problems. It resulted in condemnations and the 
suspension of Mali’s cooperation ties. The same day that the coup became a certainty, on 
March 22, ECOWAS condemned firmly “les actions mal avisées des mutins.”50 Likewise, 
ECOWAS reminded the mutineers of their responsibility according to the Constitution as 
well as the Organization’s policy of “zéro tolerance à l’égard de toute tentative de prise ou 
de maintien du pouvoir par des moyens anticonstitutionnels.”51 
Condemning the coup as ECOWAS did, the African Union (AU) suspended Mali 
until the restoration of constitutional order. In addition, it decided to send a joint AU-
ECOWAS diplomatic mission to Bamako to put pressure on the junta. Nigerian diplomat 
Paul Zolo, chairing the extraordinary meeting of the AU on the crisis in Mali, told the press 
at Addis Ababa on March 23, 2012 that, “le Conseil (de paix et de securite de l’UA) a 
decidé que le Mali sera suspendu de participation a toutes les activités (de l’organisation) 
jusqu’au retablissement de l’ordre constitutionnel [The (Peace and Security of the AU) 
Council decided that Mali will be suspended from participation in all activities (of the 
organization) until the restoration of constitutional order].”52 At the same meeting, AU 
Commission Chair Jean Ping announced the sending of a delegation to Mali.53 
Following the AU, on Thursday March 23, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) strongly condemned “the forcible seizure of power from the democratically 
elected government of Mali by some elements of the Malian armed forces,”54 warned the 
junta about the protection of the President, and called the military to return to their 
                                                 
50 “Coup D’Etat Au Mali [Coup in Mali],” Libération.fr, March 22, 2012, accessed April 05, 2018, 
http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2012/03/21/coup-d-etat-au-mali_804886; “The misguided actions of the 
mutineers.” 
51 “Coup D’Etat Au Mali [Coup in Mali],”; “Zero tolerance for any attempt to gain or maintain power 
by unconstitutional means.” 
52 “L’Union Africaine Suspend Le Mali [The African Union Suspends Mali],” Algérie1, accessed 
April 05, 2018, https://www.algerie1.com/actualite/l-union-africaine-suspend-le-mali. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Al Jazeera, “International Condemnation for Mali Coup,” News|Al Jazeera. March 23, 2012, 
accessed April 05, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/2012322234952301942.html. 
29 
barracks.55 The UNSC, through the voice of Britain’s UN ambassador Mark Lyall Grant, 
the Council president for March, clearly called for the “immediate restoration of 
constitutional rule and the democratically elected government.”56 
Bordering countries also condemned the coup in the same way. The declaration of 
France, however, at the time, was even more disturbing. If Paris officially denounced the 
coup d’état that had just been held in Mali, its declaration was, at the least, overly subtle. 
“The devil is in the details,” as it is said. In diplomacy, the truth is in the nuances. While 
countries, including the United States and international organizations—as it happens, the 
UNSC, the AU, ECOWAS—very clearly called for the reinstatement of President Amadou 
Toure Touré, France merely demanded elections as soon as possible. The French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppe, known for his adulatory speech about rebels’ prowess, 
declared on the TV channel Europe 1, on March 23, “Nous sommes attachés au respect des 
règles démocratiques et constitutionnelles. Nous demandons le rétablissement de l’ordre 
constitutionnel, des élections, elles étaient programmées pour avril, il faut qu’elles aient 
lieu le plus vite possible.”57 This suggests that, from Paris’s perspective, the history page 
of President Amadou Toumani Toure was immediately and irreversibly turned after the 
coup d’état announcement. It is curious to notice such an eagerness on the part of France, 
who knew well that it was unrealistic to hold elections at an early date.58 
The coup created internal dissension within Mali. In the days that immediately 
followed, institutions established by the constitutions, as the parliament, were suspended. 
Soon opponents of the coup started to rise against the putschists and their supports. On 
March 29, for the first time, supporters of the putsch violently clashed with opponents 
gathered in a meeting on the Bamako Labour exchange; the throwing of stones resulted in 
several serious casualties, and the army intervened. Demonstrations were then banned and 
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the military arrested 26 anti-putschist leaders. Six were detained in Kati’s camp; the rest 
were released.59 
The coup created an organizational problem within the military. That is, it abruptly 
broke the chain of command. Military forces, particularly the ones who were on the 
frontline, did not know who was in the control of what. As previously stated, not all of the 
military was associated with the coup. It was the mutiny of a handful of soldiers living in 
the garrison of Kati, the bulk of the Malian army being on deployment in the north. 
Therefore, the soldiers in the north started to demobilize. The army evacuated the localities 
of Ansongo and Bourem, likely to regroup and strengthen its positions in Gao. The 
insurgent groups seized the opportunity to further their offensive. On March 30, the NLMA 
and Ansar Dine took control of the city of Kidal. The capture of this strategic city in 
northeastern Mali pushed the junta to be alarmed by the situation, which it deemed critical, 
and to request the support of friendly countries in order to stem the rebel advance. Captain 
Amadou Aya Sanogo, the leader of the junta, declared “Les rebelles continuent à agresser 
notre pays et terroriser nos populations…notre armée a besoin du soutien des amis du Mali 
[The rebels continue to attack our country and terrorize our people...our army needs the 
support of the friends of Mali].”60 
On March 31, 2012, the city of Gao fell into the hands of the NMLA; on April 1st, 
Timbuktou fell also.61 Therefore, all the northern part was under control of insurgents, 
who declared the independence of this territory on April 6, 2012. 
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2. ECOWAS’s Responses 
ECOWAS’s involvement in Mali, since the coup, consisted of urging the junta to 
hand over power to civilian authorities. Following its condemnation of the coup, on March 
22, ECOWAS president Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the head of a delegation, undertook 
a trip to Bamako in order to discuss matters with the junta. Having failed to land due to 
demonstrators’ occupation of the runway, the aircraft were redirected to Abidjan, where a 
crisis meeting was held. The final communique of this meeting, held behind closed doors 
at Abidjan airport, gave a 72-hour ultimatum to the junta to restore constitutional order. 
After this deadline, the organization would resort to diplomatic and financial sanctions 
including an embargo against the country. The main envisaged sanctions were a travel ban 
and asset freeze for the members of the junta, the closure of borders and the denial of port 
access, and the freezing of Mali’s accounts in the Central Bank of West African States. 
Obviously, ECOWAS’s menace of sanctions had an effect on Captain Sanogo, 
who, the next day, apologized to ECOWAS for the “incident malheureux indépendant de 
notre volonté.”62 The unfortunate incident he was referring to was the demonstrators’ 
opposition to the aircrafts’ landing in Bamako airport the day before. Also, on April 1st, 
Sanogo did decide to restore the Malian constitution: “Nous prenons l’engagement solennel 
de rétablir à compter de ce jour la Constitution de la république du Mali du 25 février 1992, 
ainsi que les institutions républicaines.”63 He added, however, “Toutefois, compte-tenu de 
la situation de crise multi-dimensionnelle que vit notre pays, et afin de permettre une 
transition dans de bonnes conditions et de préserver la cohésion nationale, (nous) décidons 
d’engager, sous l’égide du médiateur, des consultations avec toutes les forces vives du pays 
dans le cadre d’une convention nationale.... [Taking into account the multi-dimensional 
crisis situation that our country is experiencing, however, and in order to allow a transition 
                                                 
62 “Menac,” Abidjan.net, accessed April 06, 2018, http://news.abidjan.net/h/430527.html; 
“Unfortunate incident beyond our control.” 
63 “Mali: La Junte Rétablit La Constitution [Mali: The Junta Reinstates The Constitution],” FIGARO. 
April 01, 2012, accessed April 06, 2018, http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2012/04/01/97001-
20120401FILWWW00091-mali-junte-veut-retablir-la-constitution.php; “We make the solemn commitment 
to restore from this day the Constitution of the Republic of Mali of February 25, 1992, as well as the 
republican institutions.” 
32 
in good conditions and preserve national cohesion, (we) decide to engage, under the aegis 
of the mediator, in consultations with all the forces of the country in the framework of a 
national convention….”64 Visibly, the declaration did not satisfy ECOWAS, which was 
looking for power to be handed over to the president of the Parliament. Thus, considering 
that the junta had not reestablished the constitutional order as requested, ECOWAS 
decided, on April 2, on the immediate preparation of ECOMOG and a total embargo on 
Mali. Having taken note of the decision, Amadou Haya Sanogo declared that “l’urgence 
est le recouvrement de l’intégrité territorial [The urgency is the recovery of territorial 
integrity].”65 
On April 6, the junta signed an agreement with ECOWAS in which it undertook to 
return the power to civilian authorities after the resignation of the overthrown president. 
Then, the president of Parliament became president for the transition period. The 
agreement provided for the appointment of a prime minister with “plein pouvoir” and that 
elections would be organized within 40 days. It also provided that an amnesty law be 
adopted against the perpetrators of the coup. On this basis, ECOWAS decided, on April 8, 
to lift all the sanctions. 
As a result, President Amadou Toumani Touré formally handed his resignation 
letter to Burkina Faso’s foreign minister, Djibril Bassolé. On this basis, the Constitutional 
Court recognized power vacancy on April 10 and, as provided in the Constitution, invested 
Dioncounda Traoré, president of Parliament, to serve out the office of president for the 
transition period. In its judgement, the Constitutional Court stipulated that a presidential 
election must be held at least 21 days and not more than 40 days from that date.66 
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For the smooth running of the transition, on April 26, ECOWAS invited the 
Military Committee to submit to civilian authorities and its members returned to the 
barracks. In addition, realizing the impossibility of organizing the presidential election by 
the required date, ECOWAS decided to extend the mandate of the transitional authorities 
from 40 days, as provided by the accord, to 12 months. To this end, ECOWAS advanced 
the idea of sending a regional military force to Bamako in order to secure “les organes de 
la transition et le gouvernement intérimaire en attendant que le processus arrive à son terme 
[the transitional bodies and the interim government until the process comes to an end].”67 
That military force should also counter rebel incursions in the south. 
Faced with these demands, the putschists were restless at Kati garrison. At the end 
of his meeting with the foreign minister of Burkina Faso and the African Integration 
minister of Cote d’Ivoire—who had come especially to Bamako to inform him about 
ECOWAS’s decisions—Captain Sanogo rejected the transitional authorities’ mandate 
extension: a decision made without consultation with the junta. He also believed that a 
consensual personality must succeed the president to date. Captain Sanogo stated 
“Monsieur Dioncounda Traoré restera président par intérim, comme prévu, pendant les 
quarante jours—pas une heure de plus—aucun militaire ne foutra les pieds ici si ce n’est 
sur la demande du gouvernement malien et on a un gouvernement en bonne et due forme. 
Et j’en profite pour dire ici que le gouvernement ne le demandera pas. Si la Cédéao...veut 
nous aider, cette aide est la bienvenue, mais à une condition: c’est à nous d’en exprimer le 
besoin...[Mr. Dioncounda Traoré will remain acting president, as planned, during the forty 
days—no more than an hour—no military man will kick his feet here except on the request 
of the Malian government—and we have a government in due form. And I take the 
opportunity to say here that the government will not ask for it. If ECOWAS...wants to help 
us, this help is welcome, but on one condition: it is up to us to express the need...].”68 He 
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continued, “Je n’accepterai pas la présence d’un soldat étranger sur le sol malien [I will not 
accept the presence of a foreign soldier on Malian soil].”69 
On April 30, 2012, about a month after the 2012 military coup initiated by Captain 
Sanogo, soldiers from the 33rd Parachute Commando Regiment (PCR) tried a counter-
coup, which failed. 
ECOWAS’s effort, although salutary to some extent and crowned by the return of 
the constitutional order, did not end the institutional crisis in Bamako. Power remained 
within the hands of the junta, who also warned that not an hour would be added to the 
transition time. Knowing that the elections could not be held to date, the junta plotted to 
oust the interim president and take formal power after the 40-day interim time. That is how, 
on May 21, the 40th day of transition time, the junta let crowds of pro-putschist protesters 
enter the offices of the acting president and severely beat him. Only in the face of the 
emotion that this event inspired within the national conscience and abroad, did the junta 
refrain from returning to the front scene to seize power after that. Thus, Prime Minister 
Cheick Modibo Diarra fulfilled his executive responsibilities until the president came back 
from the hospital Val de Grace in France and retook office. Even after the president’s 
return, however, the reality of state power remained within the hands of the junta. Captain 
Sanogo became general. 
Meanwhile, in the north, the population was suffering from jihadists’ occupation. 
Amputations, stoning, lashes, and destruction of local sites of cultural heritage, also 
classified by UNESCO as World Heritage sites, became their daily lot. Jihadists finally 
chased NMLA from Tombouctou and Gao on June 28, 2012 and became the only authority 
in the north regions. NMLA was no longer militarily present on the ground, but its political 
wing compensated for this absence with media campaigns on French TV channels. Moussa 
Ag Assarid, who was NMLA’s representative in Europe, did this media work. In reality, 
though, most of NMLA’s combatants only bandwagoned with jihadists who were stronger, 
both in term of financial assets and military equipment. 
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ECOWAS seemed to lose initiative in favor of the insurgents who proposed to enter 
into negotiations with Bamako. On November 16, 2012, emissaries from Ancar Dine and 
NMLA met Blaise Compaore, ECOWAS’s designed mediator for the Malian crisis, in 
Ouagadougou, and announced their readiness to engage in political dialogue with Bamako. 
Two days earlier, Ancar Dine had promised to renounce the imposition of sharia in the 
country, with the exception of Kidal, and to help to rid the north of terrorism and foreign 
movements. This was only a maneuver to distract both Mali and the international 
community’s attention from the movements’ real purpose, which would soon be unveiled. 
The insurgents just wanted to save time and prepare themselves for their next operations. 
On January 11, 2013, they launched an assault on Malian forces in Konna, with the goal of 
advancing towards the capital and definitely taking control of the whole country. It was in 
view of the incapacity of the Malian forces to face the jihadist breakthrough that President 
Dioncounda Traore, in power at Bamako, called France to help. Meanwhile, Sarkozy had 
lost the elections. A new leader, with different sentiment, different perspective, and 
different political thought on the Malian crisis, came to power in France. In sum, a new 
idiosyncrasy inhabited the Elysée. 
Francois Hollande decided to involve French forces on January 13, 2013, at the 
demand of Malian President Dioncounda Traore, to prevent Mali from being captured and 
becoming a Salafist state and sanctuary for terrorists. That would pose grave security 
problems both to West Africa and to Europe. Chadian troops followed, then ECOWAS 
troops. Why had ECOWAS not taken the leading role in addressing the Malian crisis? The 
next chapter addresses this question. 
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IV. TESTING EXPLANATIONS FOR ECOWAS’S NON-
INTERVENTION IN THE MALIAN CRISIS 
As described above, the Malian crisis caused a rather superficial involvement of the 
sub-regional organization. The bulk of its task had been to force the junta to return to 
constitutional normalcy; which was, definitively, more apparent than real. During the ten 
months of the occupation of two-thirds of Malian national territory by rebel jihadists, 
ECOWAS did not succeed in generating a force that could support the Malian army in its 
struggle against rebel jihadists. Yet, the principle of subsidiarity as well as ECOWAS text 
provisions—notably Article 4 of the 1981 Protocol relating to mutual assistance on 
defense, and Article 22 of the 1999 Protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict 
prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping, and security—called for its 
intervention. At the time, Benin’s president, Yayi Boni, was warning that time was playing 
against ECOWAS and that there was urgency to intervene in Mali without any need for 
UN mandate, as was the case in Liberia, “Nos textes nous y autorisent...pas besoin d’un 
accord de l’Onu [Our texts allow us...no need for a UN agreement].”70 
The French intervention on January 13, 2013 had a spillover effect, leading to 
AFISMA’s deployment. Why such bandwagoning? Why did ECOWAS not intervene in 
the war in Mali before the French intervention? Are previous authors’ theories applicable 
in this case? Did the Malian crisis not present a threat to the national interests of the 
ECOWAS member states? Did the relations between the states of ECOWAS and Mali not 
present a good configuration for the engagement? Did ECOWAS lack sufficient resources 
for implementing the adequate policy? This chapter will test these hypotheses. 
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A. HYPOTHESIS 1: NATIONAL INTEREST 
The hypothesis that national interest triggers intervention argues that states act 
primarily for their own sake. The official speech may be to protect or rescue peoples in 
danger but their real motivations for interventions are to promote their own interests in 
quelling preventively the risks and preemptively the threats. National interest can even 
become less serious sometime, as just for gaining personal prestige. 
The national interest hypothesis predict that Mali’s neighboring countries would 
intervene quickly in the fight against rebel jihadists because of the threat of contagion. 
Although neighboring states had manifestly a national interest in doing so, however, as we 
will see below, the predictions were not realized, at least not immediately. 
It was presented and illustrated in the literature review that there was a difference 
between the official discourses and the real motivations for ECOWAS-led interventions. 
James J. Hentz argues that, “in general, national interests underwrite regional actions.”71 
According to the author, national interests can include supporting an ally, demonstrating 
to the broader community that a given state actor is meaningful player, preventing turmoil 
from spreading, or reacting to humanitarian crises like refugee flows. The idea of the 
national interest is very relevant in the political action and its stakes turn out to be even 
more serious and immediate in the Malian case. The Malian crisis, which undoubtedly has 
an internal dimension affecting the sovereignty of the country, national cohesion, and 
territorial integrity, also posed serious threats to a large part of the Sahel and West African 
States whose viability become questioned. Beyond the geographical, cultural, and 
sociological proximity, the states of the sub-region face similar constraints. Those 
constraints stem from factors such as the fragility of national unity and the existing 
favorable conditions for conveying radical religious discourses. What can be considered as 
active patterns in the Malian crisis are dormant in many neighboring states. A possible 
success of the insurrection in Mali would have, undoubtedly, brought to other West African 
countries the Islamist and separatist danger. Therefore, acting proactively in Mali would 
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have been in accordance with their national interest as it could have prevented them from 
hosting similar conflicts within their territories in the near future.  
West African countries are for the most part fragile nation states. The cycle of 
violence, opposition to central authorities—whatever their forms, identity movements, or 
simple rebellion—remains regular throughout the region. If one form is absent, the other 
very likely exists. In Senegal, there is Casamance conflict; Niger experienced the same 
rebellion as Mali did; Algeria struggles with the Kabyles’ case; Cote d’Ivoire experienced 
violent rebellion and lost control of its north for about a decade; and tensions are palpable 
between Peulhs and Malinkes in Guinea Conakry, to name only a few. An insurgency in 
Mali, in one way or another, has potential to inspire, in other places, other actors, whether 
their discontents were identity-based or not. If an event like the Touareg rebellion 
succeeded, even de facto as opposed to de jure, that would very likely be emulated in other 
countries like Niger. Not to mention, several other communities like the Movement of 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the separatists of Casamance, and many others 
not heard yet would not hesitate to follow suit. 
One can go further in exploring the contagion effect hypothesis by asking how far 
the ambition of jihadists present in Mali for the region was. Were they about to be satisfied 
by turning solely Mali into an Islamic state with sharia as ruling law or did they have greater 
ambition? Observers will attribute to those jihadists higher ambition for two reasons. First, 
appetite comes with eating and empirical evidence, from Germany’s territorial ambition in 
World War II to the rise of contemporary ISIS in the Middle East, would not go against 
that truth. Oumar Ould Hamaha, AQIM and Ansar Dine’s high-ranking combatant who 
was killed by Serval Aviation on the night of March 7 to 8, 2014, hinted that “le djihad est 
sans fin et sans limite”72 [“jihad is endless and limitless”]. This can be taken as a clear 
warning for everyone. Second, all the principle of republicanism, norms, and good 
neighboring between Mali and its neighbors would not be relevant anymore because the 
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state type that was about to stand would have ignored them all and all previous 
engagements. What about the possibility of jihadist relays or dormant cells in other 
countries ready to continue or facilitate terrorist penetration from Mali? The same Oumar 
Ould Hamaha, envisioning an eventual confrontation with ECOWAS stated that,  
On est prêt a affronter n’importe quelle armée…nous prévenons d’avance 
tous les Etats qui tenterons de nous agresser d’une punition impitoyable et 
que nous transmettrons cette guerre au sein de leur propre capitale et qu’ils 
sachent d’avance que nous avons des centaines de fidaiin élu au premier 
rang, c’est pas n’importe qui hein, élu au premier rang, prêts pour les 
opérations martyres et n’attendent que l’ordre à exécuter. Et ne soyez pas 
curieux si je vous dis qu’ils sont déjà dans toutes les capitales avec leur 
explosif qui est déjà préparé là-bas chez eux. Nous on n’a pas besoin de 
missile. Avec les simples engrais nous on peut faire des explosifs, détruire 
presque toute la planète [we are ready to confront any army...we anticipate 
in advance all the states that will attempt to attack us with ruthless 
punishment and we will transmit this war within their own capital and that 
they know in advance that we have hundreds of fidaiin elected in the first 
rank, it is not anyone who is eh, elected in the first rank, ready for 
martyrdom operations and only waiting for the order to be executed. And 
do not be curious if I tell you that they are already in all capitals with their 
explosive that are already prepared there at home. We do not need a missile. 
With simple fertilizers we can make explosives, destroy almost the whole 
planet].73 
Thus, the worrying raised from the question about insurgents’ ambition is seen to 
be justified and even more concerning is the fact that there are actually favorable conditions 
for radical religious discourses to spread. In effect, the usual practice of Sufi Islam in West 
Africa, tolerant and anchored in the local traditional values, more and more, becomes 
challenged by the breakthrough of Wahhabi Salafist movement and speech of Saudi 
emanation. 
Definitely, the states in the Sahel had national interest—as did ECOWAS—to act, 
beyond the political speech, decisively against the usurpers who attacked Mali and 
threatened them as well. The threat to those national interests are, on one hand, the danger 
that the war crosses Mali’s borders and, on the other hand, the risk of ideological or 
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psychological emulation for jihad. Things did not go that way, however. One can infer then 
from the Mali case that when states’ national interests actually are not directly threatened, 
they remain risk averse as long as possible. An indirect threat to national interests in the 
referred case was still important, to arouse rhetorical statement at the least, but not 
sufficient to engender a decisive military action. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 2: PERSONAL POLITICS 
Personal politics are typically shaped more by a leader’s preference of supporting 
his relatives or clients than by institutional or impersonal social forces. Arguing about 
politics, President Leopold Sedar Senghor, once, said, “When I say ‘politics,’...it is not a 
question of the art of governing the State for the public welfare in the general framework 
of laws and regulations. It is a question of politician politics: the struggles of clans—not 
even [ideological] tendencies—to place well oneself, one’s relatives, and one’s clients in 
the cursus honorum, that is the race for preferment.”74 Senghor’s statement takes up the 
essence of personal politics in the sense that it operates both in the domestic politics and in 
international politics, especially in West Africa. In the case of personal politics, the norms 
affecting political action are more rooted in friendship, kinship, factional alliance, and 
ethnic fellowship than in broader consideration of general wellbeing.  
The very relationship between leaders—whether friendliness, empathy, or 
animosity—is one key, among others, that can help in better understanding their political 
decisions and actions towards each other, as such, in any framework. Hentz’ study of the 
Liberian crisis provides us with evidence. The author explains that the commitment of 
Babangida, Nigeria’s President during the Liberian crisis of the 90s, was motivated by his 
friendship with Samuel Doe, President of Liberia. Equally, Houphouet Boigny, President 
of Cote d’Ivoire, supported Charles Taylor, leader of the rebellion National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia (NPFL), because President Doe failed to prevent the murder of President Robert 
Tolbert’s son Adolphus Tolbert, the husband of Boigny’s adopted daughter named Daisy. 
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Lastly, the support that Blaise Compaore, Burkina Faso’s President provided to Taylor, 
was justified by the fact that Compaore married Daisy, the widow of Adolphus Tolbert. 
The personal politics hypothesis predicts that ECOWAS would be quick to 
intervene in aid of Malian President Toure if the latter shared personal ties with the leaders 
of any of the organization’s members, preferably the powerful ones. Alternatively, 
ECOWAS would not intervene fast if Toure had enmity with any of the leaders. Yet, the 
research did not identify these types of special relationship between President Amadou 
Toumani Touré and his peers in the region, and the geography of Mali and the chronology 
of events suggest low probability for enmity. Nonetheless, the experience of wars with 
Burkina Faso could be the one exception. 
Mali’s geographic situation and the chronology of events suggest a low probability 
of contention feeding enmity between President Amadou Toumani Toure and his regional 
peers. Good neighborliness is a geopolitical imperative for Mali, since the country is 
enclaved without opening to the sea, and surrounded by seven neighbors. With an 
underdeveloped industrial sector, Mali imports a large part of consumer goods; therefore, 
it depends on neighbors’ seaports. The geographical position of Mali and its economic 
imperatives impose a foreign policy that promotes peaceful relationship and good 
neighborliness with bordering countries. This is why maintaining good neighborliness is 
one of the main strategic axes of Mali’s diplomacy, implying not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of other states and not to take part in factions’ opposition, in any form whatsoever. 
By the time the Malian crisis began, many countries in the sub-region had acquired 
new leader figures, or were about to, thanks to the democratic alternation or regime change. 
It is highly probable that the Malian president, at the time, had not had time to develop any 
kind of personal linkage with most of them and vice versa. For example, the president of 
Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, and the former president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, 
were elected less than one year before Mali’s crisis broke out. The presidents of Cote 
d’Ivoire and Guinea were elected only a year before. As for Senegal, the country was in 
the midst of organizing its presidential election: a less likely time for a big move in 
international politics. There was a dean among the heads of state in the sub-region, 
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however: Blaise Compaore, who had already spent 25 years in the presidency of Burkina 
Faso by 2012. 
Mali experienced wars with Burkina Faso and, at the time, the acting president of 
this country, Blaise Compaore, personally took part in the last war between the two 
countries. The balance of power was definitely with Mali during the war of the Agacher 
Strip, in December 1985.75 He might have held some resentment against Mali since. 
Compaore was also the designated mediator of ECOWAS in the Malian crisis. In April 
2011, the rebels whom Compaore had long supported against Laurent Gbagbo, the 
president of Côte d’Ivoire, succeeded in removing Gbagbo from office, following a 
contested presidential election with Alassane Dramane Ouattara. Thus, Ouattara became 
President of Cote d’Ivoire in 2011 and, on February 17, 2012, was elected President of the 
Conference of Heads of State of ECOWAS.76 Since Compaore had supported the rebels 
that removed Laurent Gbagbo from office, a privileged personal relationship may have 
existed between Ouattara and Compaore, giving the latter greater freedom in his initiatives 
for Mali.77 Compaore, in fact, was suspected of providing assistance to rebel movements, 
to the detriment of Mali. This point will be discussed later in the section dedicated to the 
trusting question and the questioning of ECOWAS’s real commitment for the sake of 
Mali’s territorial sovereignty. 
To sum up, personal politics worked slight differently in the Mali case. There were 
not any particularly positive relationships between Touré and other West African leaders. 
There was also no particular personal antagonism between President Touré and most of his 
counterparts in the region. The president of Burkina Faso, however, likely held resentment 
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because of the defeat his armies experienced in combat against Mali in 1985.78 Compaore’s 
personal relationship with the acting president of ECOWAS ensured him more freedom in 
his Machiavellian schemes with Mali. Thus, personal politics, one can say, acted in the 
Mali case as a corruptive element that prevented vigorous and timely response from the 
regional body, in the face of jihadist invasion and occupation of the country. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 3: ORGANIZATION RESOURCES 
The resources of the organization refer to all the means available to this 
organization to face problems falling within its jurisdiction and competence. These means 
are human, economic, and legal but also experience gained in practicing similar activities. 
If the organization had those resources, it would intervene quickly but, if resources were 
more constrained, it would not.  
ECOWAS, although not the most effective organization, has a reasonable level of 
resources. ECOWAS, as we saw in the introduction, was not intended to be a specialized 
security organization, unlike others like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
which is a military alliance for collective defense. In effect, the security mandate came 
later, in addition to ECOWAS’s initial mission of economic integration. That was done 
over time with the adoption of successive protocols, then the organization’s founding treaty 
revision, and lastly the entry into force of supplementary riders. Today, ECOWAS, like 
NATO, has its own mechanism to ensure collective security for its member states. 
Unlike NATO, however—which has its own force and equipment and does 
exercises regularly for the purpose of successful deployability—ECOWAS’s standing 
force (ECOMOG) is not distinct from the units that compose the national armies of the 
organization’s member states. This standing force does not have its own operational 
resources or permanent command organism operating in peacetime, let alone conducting 
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regular exercises. Nonexistent operational resources create inevitable logistical 
shortcomings, the lack of a permanent command organism engenders command and 
control problems, and the absence of regular exercises generates problems of coordination 
and harmonization between troop-contributing states. 
Some scholars79 estimate that African regional bodies, like their member states, are 
ill equipped to act alone and stabilize hotspots on the continent. As far as ECOWAS is 
concerned, this argument was accurate, until the almost spontaneous intervention of 
ECOMOG in Liberia in 1990. Since then, however, ECOMOG has gained in maturity and 
experience. In 1994, ECOMOG was able to mobilize a staff of nearly 20,000 men, officers, 
and soldiers.80 In 1997, it intervened in Sierra Leone, before giving up the place to a UN 
mission in 2000. It successfully contributed to the return of peace to Liberia in 1999. 
ECOMOG also deployed in Guinea Bissau, in 1999, and in Cote d’Ivoire, after the signing 
of the Marcoussis Agreement in January 2003. The organization therefore intervened 
several times in crises in West Africa with varying degrees of success. It also acted based 
on ambiguous text provisions, at best, in most of these interventions.  
In addition to the experience gained and the operational prowess achieved, one must 
not forget factors of institutional and legal evolution. ECOMOG was initially an ad hoc 
force, but became a permanent force in 1999, with ECOWAS’s adoption of the Protocol 
on Mechanism for Prevention, Management, Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and 
Security. This Protocol conceived of ECOMOG as a permanent force whose elements are 
on reserve in their respective countries of origin and ready to be deployed as soon as 
possible (Article 21). ECOMOG objectives are essentially ceasefire supervision, peace 
maintenance and construction, preventive deployments, and disarmament of irregular 
armed forces (Article 22). 
The financing mechanism is also well integrated. In effect, the Protocol’s Articles 
36 and 37 provide a comprehensive budgeting for the mechanism’s activities. Article 36 
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provides annual budgeting arrangements that includes the Community Levy; UN, AU, and 
other international agencies’ funding; voluntary contributions; grants; and bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation. Article 37 provides the pre-financing option. In this regard, states 
providing units may be asked to cover the costs of operations in the first three months and 
ECOWAS will reimburse them within a maximum period of six months, as well as 
ensuring the continuation of the financing of operations. 
In the Malian crisis, ECOWAS had clear text provision to act and a substantial 
wealth of experience, having intervened in several crises before. The organization also had 
an appropriate financing system. Therefore, it had sufficient capabilities to intervene. 
ECOWAS did not intervene until the French move in January 2013, however, in response 
to the rebel jihadists’ offensive toward the south of the country. 
To conclude, the evidence does not support the organization resources hypothesis, 
since ECOWAS has previously intervened in crises without clear text provisions or 
equivalent terrain experiences. Moreover, no international body—universal, regional, or 
transregional—can claim to have all the needed resources to do whatever its mandate calls 
for. I argue, instead, that political will is more important.81  
D. HYPOTHESIS 4: DOMESTIC INSECURITY IN MEMBER STATES 
Domestic insecurity consumes national resources, which ultimately affect states’ 
power. Domestic insecurity forcibly directs leaders’ focus more on internal affairs that 
leave fewer resources for commitment abroad. The hypothesis, here, predicts that the more 
stable are other ECOWAS member states, the more are they willful and able to undertake 
military intervention in other hotspot places in the region to restore peace. Conversely, if 
they themselves face internal security dilemmas, they are less likely to dare to adventure. 
While member states are committed, in theory, to making forces available for ECOWAS 
interventions, those forces may not be available in practice. 
                                                 
81 A proverb from Mali says that, “Before asking for help to kill a dangerous lion that threatens you, 
you must first have mastery of its head.” This means that you should begin the task first with the means you 
have, then others may come in aid to you.  
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There is a clear link between strong political leadership and effective state action 
abroad. Frédéric Charillon suggests that, when a solidity or strength is observable in the 
executive—as a recognized legitimacy, a stability of the internal political situation, a 
popularity, a perspective of long-term action, including a renewal of the mandate—it may 
contribute in many ways to the development of an effective foreign policy. During the Mali 
case, Charillon’s criteria for effective foreign policy were not met. Knowing that the 
decision of intervening flowed from the national capitals to regional headquarters, and that 
“the likelihood of regional or subregional organizations intervening is exponentially 
increased if the subregional hegemon favors it,”82 this author tests Charillon’s criteria—of 
leaders’ legitimacy and domestic stability—on the cases of Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria, two 
important ECOWAS member states. 
West Africa has experienced a turbulent period during the last decades. The Malian 
crisis came abruptly at a time when other hotbeds of tensions were just ending in some 
countries like Cote d’Ivoire (the post-electoral crisis), while they were underway in others 
like Nigeria (the Boko Haram insurgency). The security problems were alive within key 
ECOWAS states. Since power projection requires a stable domestic situation and a 
reasonable measure of legitimacy for the leaders, problems of domestic politics may have 
impeded a number of West African leaders from risking the adventure of Mali, where 
insurgents had substantial military capabilities. The risks posed by the crisis in Mali to their 
national security appeared, then, far away in comparison to more direct security threats 
hanging over their persons and their regimes. Consequently, they needed to focus attention 
and concentrate forces on their domestic issues, rather than abroad.  
In Cote d’Ivoire, in 2012, President Alassane Dramane Ouattara was dealing with 
a post-election crisis. He himself came to power in 2011 following the election described 
above. The context of his accession to the presidency naturally augurs that the country’s 
pacification would not be easy task, since he was not fully accepted and his legitimacy was 
continuously questioned. Toto Jérôme Balou Bi, an Ivorian scholar, argued that Alassane 
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Dramane Ouattara was illegally invested in the function of President of Cote d’Ivoire. 
According to the author,  
au regard de la Constitution Ivoirienne, ce sont les résultats définitifs du 
scrutin qui confèrent la qualité de Président de la République (Articles 39 
et 94). Or la décision du Conseil Constitutionnel du 04 mai 2011, 
proclamant Monsieur OUATTARA, Président de la République, ne fait 
aucune référence aux résultats définitifs du scrutin du 28 novembre 2010; 
le Conseil se contente de dire qu’il «fait siennes, les décisions du Conseil 
de Paix et de Sécurité de l’Union Africaine, sur le règlement de la crise en 
Côte d’Ivoire» [under the Ivorian Constitution, it is the final results of the 
vote that confer the status of President of the Republic (Articles 39 and 94). 
The decision of the Constitutional Council of May 4, 2011, proclaiming Mr. 
OUATTARA President of the Republic, however, makes no reference to 
the final results of the election of November 28, 2010; the Council is content 
to say that it “adopts the decisions of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union, on the settlement of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.”]83 
Therefore, Ouattara, who began his presidential mandate in a difficult context—the 
hostile feelings of many of his compatriots and the demobilization of rebels—could hardly 
mobilize a fighting force and project power at this time. Naturally, his priority, his 
attention, and all his energy were focused on the domestic issues. Moreover, the rebels, 
then integrated into the reformed Ivorian Army, named the Republican Force of Cote 
d’Ivoire, continued to resort to mutinies to obtain advantages from Ouattara. In regard to 
all of this situation, one concludes that Cote d’Ivoire did not have the structured force able 
to undertake the sort of military campaign needed in Mali’s north.  
Nigeria, meanwhile, faced the ravages of the Boko Haram insurgency that started 
in 2009. First, the Nigerian army crushed the insurrection in 2009. In 2010, however, Boko 
Haram reorganized itself and took the initiative against the Nigerian forces. The substantial 
military means committed by Nigeria in the war against Boko Haram, nevertheless, seemed 
insufficient. As such, the Nigerian president of the time, Goodluck Jonathan, in an 
interview with the Wall Street Journal, said, “Si le Nigeria a un problème, et bien j’attends 
des Etats-Unis qu’ils viennent nous aider [If Nigeria has a problem, I expect the United 
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States to come help us].”84 There, also, insecurity and instability at the domestic level 
could annihilate the potential to mobilize the required forces and resources for conducting 
a military campaign abroad.  
Definitively, instable domestic situations consume national resources and corrode 
states’ power. Domestic insecurity also makes leaders more concerned about internal 
issues, rather than outside problems. Those two effects that come from internal instability, 
one can definitely say, contributed to ECOWAS’s slow response in the Mali’s case.  
E. HYPOTHESIS 5: DISTRUST OF ECOWAS 
The chapter has tested several hypotheses on factors influencing ECOWAS’s 
responsiveness and effectiveness in the Malian cases. National interests and organizational 
resources do not seem to perform very well, while personal politics seem somewhat valid 
but do not fully explain ECOWAS’s failure to act. Domestic insecurity contributed to 
ECOWAS’s slow response. To fully explain ECOWAS’s slow response, however, we need 
to consider a fifth hypothesis: distrust of ECOWAS. The will of the states is the foundation 
of any intergovernmental organization. The will is a process of faith in organizational 
morality. When this faith in the morality of the organization is shaken, it can result in the 
paralysis of the organization itself. The awareness of other engines for ECOWAS’s actions 
—outside the sole promotion of states’ general interest—erodes that trust, which in turn 
has a paralytic effect on the organization’ decision process and ultimately its action. In the 
Mali case, distrust was noticeable regarding Bamako’s posture towards ECOWAS. This 
suspicion seemed justified, regarding both ECOWAS’s inaction and actions.  
Since the coup, the new authorities in Bamako had requested logistical and 
intelligence support from ECOWAS, hoping to liberate the north, using Malian armed 
forces. The acting President of Mali, Dioncounda Traore, wanted neighbors’ logistical 
support, and later their participation, in the maintenance of order, once the cities of the 
north were taken back from the jihadists. In this regard, at the end of the extraordinary 
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meeting of the sub-committee of the chiefs of staff of ECOWAS, held in Abidjan on August 
24, 2012, his General Chief of Staff, Colonel Major Ibrahima Dembélé, said, “Personne ne 
fera cette guerre à la place du Mali, mais les autres viendront en appui, surtout en aviation, 
en logistique [Nobody will make this war instead of Mali, but the others will come in 
support, especially in aviation, logistics].”85 For the General Chief of Staff, a foreign 
military presence would be justified only if Malian forces were insufficient. Regarding the 
size of this support force, he suggested that “ça pourra aller jusqu’à deux, trois bataillons 
sur le territoire malien….Pas à Bamako, mais sur les premières lignes pour la reconquête, 
au cas où les troupes maliennes ne suffiraient pas [it can go up to two, three battalions on 
the territory of Mali…Not in Bamako, but on the first lines for the reconquest, in case the 
Malian troops would not be enough].”86 
ECOWAS, on the other hand, estimated that logistical support was insufficient to 
resolve the crisis and wanted West African troops not to be confined to a passive position. 
Instead of sending them directly to the battlefield, where the invaders were, however, 
ECOWAS wanted to position those forces in Bamako, supposedly to secure the city and 
its institutions. Discussions between Malian authorities and ECOWAS about the issue of 
stationing troops in the capital city took eleven months, from April 2012 to the French 
intervention in January 2013. 
Meanwhile, the types of support that Mali requested were not given and the 
population in the north continued to suffer the ravages of occupation. ECOWAS said at the 
time that it was waiting for Bamako’s official request for assistance. Thus, in an official 
correspondence dated September 4, 2012, the president addressed the Chairperson of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, 
saying, “Reconquérir le Nord est le défi majeur et pour cela une assistance est nécessaire 
pour remettre à niveau rapidement les unités de l’armée [Reconquering the north is the 
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major challenge and for this assistance is needed to quickly upgrade the units of the 
army].”87 President Traoré asked for five battalions that will be “graduellement engagés à 
partir d’une ligne de front pour contrôler les villes reconquises [Gradually engaged from a 
front line to control the reconquered cities].”88 Concerning the security of Bamako, the 
correspondence stated, “le déploiement d’une force militaire et de police est sans objet pour 
sécuriser les institutions de la transition à Bamako [the deployment of a military and police 
force is irrelevant to secure transitional institutions in Bamako].”89 
This scenario presumably was in discordance with ECOWAS’s plan to send forces 
to Bamako before eventually reconquering the north. ECOWAS, thus, opposed Bamako’s 
terms of intervention, asking the Malian government to revise its position. On September 
19, 2012, Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso and mediator in the Malian crisis, 
announced that the conditions imposed by Bamako jeopardized an effective deployment of 
the ECOWAS troops in Mali. Ivorian Foreign Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan and African 
Integration Minister Ally Coulibaly traveled to Bamako on September 20, 2012 to hand 
over this response to Mali’s acting president, Dioncounda Traoré. 
Given that the security situation in Bamako was not as concerning as that in the 
north, sending troops to Bamako seemed unjustified. Moreover, the securing of the capital 
came to be a matter of national pride for the Malian people.90 In the view of ECOWAS’s 
uncompromising position to establish a foothold in the capital and its obvious weaker 
commitment to tackling the crux of the problem in the north, Bamako’s suspicion has a 
foundation. This suspicion in turn made Bamako more uncompromising in its opposition 
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concentrated, as directly as possible, on different German pockets of resistance throughout France. 
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to hosting ECOWAS troops in the capital. Viewed in this light, mistrust has been a 
crippling factor for ECOWAS’s action. 
The suspicion did not proceed exclusively from divergent deployments plans. 
Additional elements strengthened Bamako’s suspicion. First was ECOWAS’s blockade of 
Guinea’s seaport of armaments that Mali had bought.91 Second was the rescue operation 
that Blaise Compaore did in favor of Bilal Ag Chérif, the head of NMLA.92 Compaore sent 
a military plane to evacuate Ag Chérif in Burkina Faso, after he was seriously injured 
following clashes with other insurgent movements.93 
Definitely, Bamako distrusted ECOWAS, since the organization seemed simply to 
delay and drag things on, while appeasing invaders. Therefore, it refused to subscribe to 
ECOWAS’s scheme. Mistrust, therefore, worked to curb the action of ECOWAS. 
 
                                                 
91 RFI, “Les Armes Destinées Au Mali Toujours Bloquées En Guinée Par La Cédéao [Weapons 
Destined In Mali Still Blocked In Guinea By The ECOWAS],” RFI Afrique, September 07, 2012, accessed 
August 10, 2018, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120907-armes-mali-guinee-cedeao-afrique-ouest-toumani-
toure. 
92 “Intervention De La Cedeao: Pourquoi Sanogo Hésite [ECOWAS Intervention: Why does Sanogo 
Hesitate],” Maliweb.net. September 24, 2012, accessed July 26, 2018, https://www.maliweb.net/armee/
intervention-de-la-cedeao-pourquoi-sanogo-hesite-93910.html. 
93 “Le Président Du MNLA Evacué Par L’armée Burkinabè [The President of the MNLA evacuated 
by the Burkinabe army],” Maliweb.net, July 02, 2012, accessed August 10, 2018, https://www.maliweb.net/
insecurite/le-president-du-mnla-evacue-par-larmee-burkinabe-77160.html. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
ECOWAS started as an organization with a vocation of integration and promotion 
of the economies of the states of West Africa through the harmonization of sectoral policies 
and the facilitation of the circulation of people, goods, and services through space. With 
the advent of civil war within many member states, however, as well as the occurrence of 
interstate wars, the organization has observed the impact of insecurity and instability on 
the pursuit of its development goal. To this end, the organization adopted two important 
additional protocols: the 1978 protocol banning the use of force and the promotion of 
peaceful settlement of disputes between member states, and the 1981 protocol providing 
the framework for a collective defense mechanism. Although incomplete, in that they did 
not directly address the problem of civil war or internal state conflicts, the 1978 and 1981 
protocols contributed to the creation of the ECOMOG force, which was first introduced in 
Liberia in November 1990. This practice led to ECOWAS’s founding treaty revision in 
1993, to integrate the peace and security dimension into the organization’s objectives. To 
date, the collective security mechanism—the provisions for the prevention, management, 
and settlement of crises by ECOWAS—can be considered as finalized, at least textually on 
a legal level.  
It is clear that ECOWAS has not fully played this role in the Malian crisis, however. 
The organization has focused more on the institutional management, with varying degrees 
of success: specifically, the return to a semblance of constitutional normalcy, although the 
reality of power remained in the hands of the junta. Hence, one notices a total failure of 
ECOWAS to support the Malian forces for recovering the zones under occupation. 
ECOWAS intervened only following the French offensive.  
This thesis has tested five possible explanations for ECOWAS’s slow response. 
The hypothesis of national interest fails because all the states in the region clearly had a 
national interest in stopping rebel jihadists and stabilizing Mali regarding the threat that 
this crisis posed to their national security. This threat did not prompt their intervention, 
however. Personal politics—considering Mali and Burkina Faso’s war history and the 
particular relationship between Blaise Compaore and Alassane Dramane Ouattara—could 
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have acted in the Mali case as a corruptive element that prevented vigorous and timely 
response from the regional body. The hypothesis of organizational resources does not 
perform well because ECOWAS had the wealth of experience, legal basis, and an 
appropriate mechanism of financing by the time the Malian crisis broke out. Therefore, 
domestic insecurity and the distrust of ECOWAS seem better explanations for 
understanding why ECOWAS did not intervene in a timely fashion in Mali. Domestic 
insecurity consumes states’ national resources and, ultimately, states’ power; it forces 
leaders to focus more on internal issues than on external commitment. The justified doubts 
that Bamako had in relation to ECOWAS’s operation plan showed a distrust that affected 
the decision-making process and ultimately ECOWAS’s action. This study discovered that 
personal politics, its corollary distrust, and domestic security challenges impeded 
ECOWAS’s responsiveness in the Mali case. If those problems are not addressed, one can 
expect in the future that in the same conditions, the same causes will produce the same 
effects. That is, ECOWAS will not be as reactive as its texts design. 
From this observation come several recommendations. The first recommendation 
is to strengthen the mechanism for crisis prevention. ECOWAS has already set up 
monitoring and early warning units in its respective states. It is about strengthening the 
capabilities of these cells so that they are better equipped and effective in the analysis of 
precursors to internal conflicts. There is also a need to strengthen the culture of democratic 
governance so that all the sensibilities in the different countries can participate fully in the 
debate and public management. To remedy the problem of the loss of confidence in 
ECOWAS, a real and long-term effort must be made. ECOWAS must once again become 
the international organization that promotes peace, stability, and development in the West 
African continent. It must avoid the habit of protecting or abandoning a leader due to 
greedy games of self-interest. This is possible if the spirit and the letter of the different 
texts are applied. Finally, ECOWAS must become a people’s organization and not a kind 
of leaders’ union. 
Beyond these recommendations, it is necessary for the organization’s effectiveness 
in security matters that all states members built solid and standardized defense apparatuses. 
As the Malian Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga once said, the addition of the 
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number zero a thousand times will remain zero. Secondly, ECOWAS forces should be 
given a permanent headquarters, placing forces under regional command, in peacetime as 
well as in time of war, in order to favor interoperability and unity of command and control.  
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